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Interviewee:  ARIFIN SIREGAR 
Interviewer:  Nancy Chng 
Date:   15 January 2015 
Location:  Jakarta, Indonesia 
 
 
0:00:19 
Nancy 
 
Pak Arifin, I'd like to thank you for agreeing to talk to us this afternoon. Can we 
find out a bit about your background and how you came about in your own 
educational achievements going to Europe? 
 
0:00:31 
Arifin 
 
I must say I came from a middle-class family, not a wealthy one, and not also a 
very poor one. My father started as a professional working for a Dutch railway 
company at that time. Later on, when we moved to Jakarta in 1950, then he 
became a businessman. Thus, his thinking was more like, civil servant so to 
speak. He was a very good father, very loving, and my mother was also a very 
loving mother, but she was really the one who pushed me to get ahead in life. I 
went to a Dutch high school both in Medan and Jakarta. It was understandable 
that after graduation from the Dutch high school I went to the Netherlands. In 
this case, I went to Rotterdam. Why? Because at that time, the Netherlands 
School of Economics had a very good reputation. At Rotterdam, I passed all 
exams, and also the Bachelor of Arts. I got a degree and before the final 
examination to get a master's degree in Economics, the Indonesian and Dutch 
governments broke off diplomatic relations in 1958. I had to leave Holland, not 
from the Dutch government, but from the Indonesian government. 
 
0:02:08 
Nancy 
 
All the students came home. 
 
0:02:09 
Arifin 
 
Yes, they had to leave Holland. Under recommendation from the Dutch 
professors, Professor Tinbergen and "Tras"[Indistinguishable], I went to 
Münster, where they had a good colleague, and I continued my studies at the 
Münster University in Germany. There, I finished up my master's degree, and 
also later on, my dissertation. I had my PhD in Economics, and I passed the exam 
magna cum laude at that time. I started working for the United Nations Secretary 
General in New York under recommendations of my Dutch and German 
professors.  Afterwards, I joined the International Monetary Fund. While there, I 
was asked by the group of Widjojo to come home, because they said that they 
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needed my services... to devote my services unto the Indonesian government. At 
that time, I liked my job with the IMF. The assignment there was very challenging 
and very interesting, but then I agreed to go back to Indonesia at the end of 1971. 
There I worked together with the group, which later on was known as the 
Widjojo's group, or some people called it Berkeley's group, Berkeley Mafia group. 
I became then, at that time, the Deputy Governor, Central Bank. I remained as 
Deputy Governor until 1983. In 1983, I became the Governor of Central Bank,  
 
0:03:49 
Nancy 
 
When you mentioned going back in the early '70s, and joining the technocrats, 
there was oil boom. Pertamina was doing very well, Ibnu Sutowo was the tsar of 
the oil industry, and people thought he was the second most important person 
after Suharto. How did that impact you as a technocrat, and then when 
Pertamina got to the brink of bankruptcy, were you personally drawn in to help 
resolve the situation?  
 
0:04:23 
Arifin 
 
It is true, in 1975, Pertamina had a problem. They were borrowing very much 
indeed from the international community and later on, they could not repay the 
loans. Indonesia was almost bankrupt at that time, and the foreign exchange in 
the Central Banks were almost depleted. So much so that, we had then, for the 
first time, go to the capital market to borrow money, for in order to replenish our 
reserves, and to stabilise the monetary situation as a consequence of the PT 
Pertamina affair. I was lucky to accompany the then Governor Rachmat Saleh, 
who was a very competent governor, to go to the capital market, and to negotiate 
with the lenders. It was very interesting that when Ibnu Sutowo was very 
powerful, like you said, was considered to be the second most powerful person 
in Indonesia, just a call from him was enough to make the lenders be willing to 
extend loans to Pertamina for hundreds of millions of dollars. 
 
0:05:37 
Nancy 
 
Without collateral? 
 
0:05:38 
Arifin 
 
Without collateral. But later on, when there was a problem with Pertamina, 
when we wanted to borrow at that time only 350 million dollars, they wanted to 
find out whether first of all, we of the Central Bank were authorised under the 
constitution to have foreign borrowing, and also in fact they went as far as asking 
us whether the President of the Republic of Indonesia was authorised under the 
constitution to borrow abroad. We had to explain everything to them, but that 
was the irony, how they changed their attitudes from one period to another one 
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because we changed situation. But later on, of course, in cooperation with the 
other parts of the government like Ministry of Finance and BAPPENAS 
(Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning), we could solve the 
Pertamina problem. So much so that we started again, what we call sound 
economic development. 
 
0:06:38 
Nancy 
 
Based on this story it seems that the high oil prices were not helpful to 
Indonesia, in the sense that there were not sound economic policies being 
implemented, but everybody was living off the wealth of petroleum. 
 
0:06:56 
Arifin 
 
Yes and no, because the technocrats were in a position to make use of the 
increased earnings to accelerate economic development like I mentioned before. 
On the other hand, some people who were close to the President, they were also 
taking advantage of the situation, like Ibnu Sutowo, and the other groups.  
 
0:07:18 
Nancy 
 
That's very diplomatically put, but these people who took advantage and nearly 
bankrupted the country, were not held accountable at all. They were not 
persecuted. Didn't it offend people... their sense of justice? 
 
0:07:36 
Arifin 
 
That is true. But as you know, President Suharto was what you call a very good 
politician. From the very beginning he did not want to rely on one group of 
advisers. One of them of course, the technocratic group. There were some other 
people like Ibnu Sutowo, and also at that time Habibie, and also other people. 
 
0:08:03 
Nancy 
 
His generals?  
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0:08:04 
Arifin 
 
I beg your pardon? 
 
0:08:05 
Nancy 
 
His generals? 
 
0:08:06 
Arifin 
 
His generals, yes that's right. Thus, we had also to share power with all these 
groups under Suharto. We could not claim, we... the technocratic group, that we 
were the only important advisers to Suharto. 
 
0:08:25 
Nancy 
 
He was balancing every group of... he's like a master “dalang” [Puppeteer]? 
 
0:08:30 
Arifin 
 
That’s right Nancy. He was a master in this case. When Suharto came to power in 
1966, '67 our economy was really very bad. 
 
0:08:42 
Nancy 
 
In shambles. 
 
0:08:43 
Arifin 
 
In shambles. Hyperinflation, practically no growth and very… shortcomings of 
infrastructure facilities. It was very, very, very, bad. 
 
0:8:54 
Nancy 
 
How did it come to that Pak, because Soekarno, when he became President, he 
was hailed as the great leader? So, what happened? What went wrong for him as 
a leader? 
 
0:09:05 
Arifin 
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It is true, that Soekarno had made a great contribution to making... to unify 
Indonesia. That was his greatest contribution. Also, to give us a sense that we 
deserve being independent. We deserve having the freedom from the Dutch. But 
later on, he remained more or less constant in his thinking and his attitude, and 
at that time he was very much involved in... foreign policy, as you know to create 
the so-called Non-Aligned Movement, new emerging forces etcetera, etcetera, 
and he did not pay attention to economic problems. In fact, according to many 
people who knew Soekarno very well, he was not interested in economic 
problems because he considered these problems as really petty. He devoted 
more time and energy to political and international politics. As consequence for 
us, our economy deteriorated very much indeed.  
 
That's why when Suharto came to power, first of all, he did not have much 
experience in governing Indonesia, and even less as far as economic matters 
were concerned. At that time, he would use of the Widjojo's group. Suharto was a 
very good learner and listener.  Later on, they coined this comparison. At that 
time within a period, when the technocrats were talking then, President Suharto 
was willing to listen and even to take notes. But later on, when he was very 
confident, as far as his ability to govern Indonesia was concerned, it was the 
other way around, that when he was talking, the technocrats were supposed to 
listen and to take notes. That is the development of Suharto as far as governing 
Indonesia was concerned. 
 
0:11:20 
Nancy 
 
Reversed roles... 
 
0:11:21 
Arifin 
 
Reversed role, yes.  
 
0:11:22 
Nancy 
 
Tell us about part of your own reputation as an economist, did you have very 
difficult decisions as a Governor of the Central Bank? What was your difficult 
period? 
 
0:11:40 
Arifin 
 
When I became the governor, the international price of oil declined very much 
indeed. As a consequence, the rate of growth in Indonesia also fell to two-point-
three percent in 1982.  We had a shortage of foreign exchange. We had to make a 
radical change in our policy. Until that time, there were a lot of regulations in the 
Indonesian economy. We think that in order to adjust to the new situation, we 
had to deregulate the economy. That was my first assignment: how to 
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deregulate? It means then, that we had to follow what we called an indirect 
monetary policy rather than direct through ceiling. I abolished all these credit-
ceiling systems. Also, I gave the freedom to the banks to fix their own interest 
rates, both on loans and on deposits. If they could mobilise enough resources, 
then they could also increase the credits depending on each bank. There's no 
general policy with regard to a limit on credits. At that time, there were about 
100 banks, and according to us, there were too many. We gave them incentives 
to merge, so that they could increase their capital base, and as a consequence 
they could increase their ability to make use of advances in technology. That was 
what they were doing. That was a radical change from the previous period, and 
the first time that Indonesian banks could act just like any other banks in other 
countries. 
 
0:13:24 
Nancy 
 
Did you put in place regulations that prevented people from abusing the banking 
system? Like bank owners borrowing from their own businesses? 
 
0:13:34 
Arifin 
 
Oh yes, but then after my assignment with the Central Bank in 1988, I became 
the Minister of Trade. At that time, my colleagues with the Central Bank, and 
with the Ministry of Finance of course, they would like to go further in the so-
called deregulation process. They opened up the banks, it means that anybody 
with a capital of 10,000,000 rupiah at that time, worth about 5,000,000, could set 
up a bank. Within a period of less than two years, the number of banks increased 
by almost 100 percent. Many of the shareholders, the owners of the banks, set up 
the banks not in order to make the banks big, but in order to make it as a vehicle 
to mobilise savings from the public, and to use these savings for their own 
projects. Thus, even when the monetary crisis or financial crisis of '97 and '98 
did not take place, the Indonesian banks would probably face a collapse, a bit 
later on, because the Central Bank was not in a position to supervise the sharply 
increasing number of banks. Also, many of the owners of the banks at that time, 
they had some contacts with the politicians. 
 
0:15:03 
Nancy 
 
Was the Central Bank itself guilty of corruption? 
 
0:15:08 
Arifin 
 
At that time, no. They were sometimes under pressure to treat some banks with... 
special gloves so to speak, yes.  
 
0:15:22  
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Nancy 
 
When you mentioned in 1988 you were appointed the Minister of Trade, was it 
one of the hardest things in your career when in, I think it was 1990, the clove 
monopoly was set up, and given to Tommy Suharto, and you were made the front 
man to explain the policy? 
 
0:15:41 
Arifin 
 
That's correct.  
 
0:15:42 
Nancy 
 
Was that a difficult thing for you to do? 
 
0:15:44 
Arifin 
 
It was very difficult indeed. I did not agree at all. First of all, when I had to deal 
with people below Suharto, I did not agree at all. But later on, when the President 
himself asked me to adopt that system, then I had to do that. 
 
0:16:01 
Nancy 
 
No choice. 
 
0:16:01 
Arifin 
 
No choice. Because at that time I could have resigned, but as you know, if I did it, 
not only would I lose my job with the Central Bank, but it was for me very 
difficult to find a job in Indonesia, because I was considered to be an opponent of 
the regime. That happened also to some people. 
 
0:16:25 
Nancy 
 
But you never signed the Petition of Fifty. 
 
0:16:29 
Arifin 
 
No. 
 
0:16:29 
Nancy 
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It wasn't that you had to be one of the signatories to be run afoul of the 
President. 
 
0:16:35 
Arifin 
 
I was not involved in any political activities. Because I don't like it. I know that 
politicians play a very, very important role but I did not think to be involved in 
political activities here. 
 
0:16:48 
Nancy 
 
But when you considered yourself an opponent, was it well-known, or it was just 
known in the inner circles, or that President Suharto regarded you as an 
opponent, because you were not a full-throated supporter of his policies. 
 
0:17:02 
Arifin 
 
Well, I... at that time I accepted it because, like I said, when people below him 
wanted to have it, I could refuse. But when he himself asked me to do that, then I 
could not have refused. 
 
0:17:15 
Nancy 
 
So, you had a heavy conscience, yet you had to carry on his orders.  
 
 
0:17:19 
Arifin 
 
Oh yes... But the second time, also another son of Suharto, would like to have a 
monopoly of oranges in Kalimantan. 
 
 
0:17:29 
Nancy 
 
This is Bambang. 
 
0:17:29 
Arifin 
 
Yes, I refused. 
 
0:17:32 
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Nancy 
 
But it went ahead anyway. 
 
0:17:33 
Arifin 
 
Yes, he went to the Governor. The Provincial Governor... 
 
0:17:36 
Nancy 
 
Of Kalimantan 
 
0:17:37 
Arifin 
 
Kalimantan... this without going to the Ministry of Trade. They went to the 
Governor, the Provincial Governor of Kalimantan. He forced him to accept his 
idea of how to monopolise the trade and production of oranges. 
 
0:18:04 
Nancy 
 
You said that short of resignation... sending in your resignation, you really could 
not stand up and oppose, or persuade Suharto that it was a very bad idea to have 
his son, have this clove monopoly, which was causing suffering to the farmers, to 
the clove farmers, as well as to the Kretek Industry, the cigarette industry. 
Nobody benefitted except Tommy Suharto. 
 
0:18:30 
Arifin 
 
I could not say about that, but what I had told him, according to me, monopoly is 
very bad. Whether it was at the hand of the son or not, so it was another 
question. I tried to come up with good arguments, but he overruled me. He 
overruled me. 
 
(00:18:52) 
Nancy 
 
But little did they know that Suharto became a very ruthless leader over his 
course of thirty-two years. He was using people, and when he didn't need them, 
he would get rid of them. 
 
0:19:03 
Arifin 
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You're right. But like I said… during the first few years of his rule, he was... made 
a lot of contribution to the revamp of Indonesia. But later on, when his children 
became also businessmen so to speak, then the situation was changed. That's 
why each person I think... like if you look at his, almost... each leader has his own 
time. If a leader remains too long in his position, wealth, power corrupts, like I 
said... and that happened also to him, and that happened also to Soekarno. 
 
0:19:41 
Nancy 
 
May I ask you about the relationship now with Habibie? He went on to become 
President after Suharto stepped down. There were some people who said that 
Suharto expected him to decline to become President himself. He surprised many 
people by accepting the presidency, how do you rate his short tenure as 
President? 
 
0:20:07 
Arifin 
 
When Habibie was still a member of the cabinet, the technocrats had some 
differences of opinion about how to develop our economy. As everybody knows, 
Habibie was very close to the President. He had the ears of the President. He got 
also a lot of projects financed by the government. But then when he became 
President, he did a lot of good things for Indonesia, especially in the 
democratisation process. He gave press freedom, he allowed people to set up 
political parties, and he released a lot of political prisoners. During his short 
period, he was only President for about one and a half years, he changed the 
political system radically. I must... we have to give credit to him for these actions.  
I think Habibie is also a very good politician, because he knew that when he 
became President, people expected quite a change in the political system. That's 
why he introduced this freedom of expressing freedom of the press, and he 
allowed people to set up political parties. He knew that the wind is blowing in 
that direction.  
 
0:21:44 
Nancy 
 
But he was not Javanese and... so he had a problem working with the mentality? 
 
0:21:54 
Arifin 
 
No, but he's... like I said, he depended when he was in the cabinet only on 
Suharto and really, he was the most favoured aide of Suharto. He could not be 
disturbed by the family members of Suharto. When he wanted to have an 
appointment with Suharto, it was very easy for him, and could last hours and 
hours, whereas we had very limited opportunity to do that. 
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0:22:27 
Nancy 
 
For you as a Batak, is a question which I would like to ask... there are all these 
different ethnic backgrounds. Did you, as a Batak, have a problem dealing with 
this central core, the Javanese core, the Javanese mentality? You said you are 
married to a Javanese yourself, but there are still these differences that you had 
to... 
 
0:22:50 
Arifin 
 
First of all, I was aware of the big differences in approach... between the 
conservative Javanese and the other people... the ethnic people of Indonesia. It 
was at the beginning rather difficult for me to adjust how to approach a problem, 
how to explain certain things to President Suharto. 
 
0:23:15 
Nancy 
 
You were too direct? 
 
0:23:16 
Arifin 
 
Yes. Later on, I got also advice from Widjojo's group how to do that, to do it in a 
gradual way. After I have told him something, I should wait for his reaction to 
know whether he agrees, does agree or not? Sometimes it’s very difficult to know 
whether he agrees or not, because of his Javanese attitude, not to show his 
emotion. But gradually I learnt even though, not very, very easily. 
 
0:23:53 
Nancy 
 
How do you assess the other presidents?  
 
0:23:57 
Arifin 
 
Gus Dur came to power, as an administrator he was rather bad, but he was the 
one who reduced the power of the military for the first time. The so-called 
Reformasi was abolished by him. Secondly, he was really very instrumental in 
promoting pluralism with regard to religious and ethnic minorities. That was his 
biggest contribution.  
 
Then you have Megawati. Megawati was considered to be the symbol of 
resistance to Suharto. She was welcomed very much indeed at the beginning, but 
later, people were also disappointed in her, because apparently, she did not do 
much for Indonesia.  
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Then came SBY (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono). At that time, people expected very 
much from him. During his first term, he did a lot to make people having better 
standards of living. But later on, he made a lot of mistakes and he was, or he is 
still very hypersensitive to any criticism. As a consequence, he wants to embrace 
all groups of people. By so doing, that he made a lot of concessions and then 
there was a lot of dissatisfaction also, because he had a lot of plans, programmes, 
but very bad in implementing all these programmes and plans. But we have to be 
fair also to him. During his period, his ten-year period, we had stability, also 
economic stability, even though the gap between the rich and the poor became 
bigger and bigger, but still there was stability. 
 
0:26:03 
Nancy 
 
How... what kind of traits, going back to ideally... you don't have a perfect 
candidate for President, but what kind of traits would you like to see in a leader? 
 
0:26:15 
Arifin 
 
For sure he should have a very good idea as to how to develop the country: a 
vision. Secondly, that he must be willing to implement all these regulations, even 
though probably some of them are not rather popular. This means that he should 
be willing to take unpopular actions for the sake of the country in the long run.  
 
0:26:43 
Nancy 
 
And willing to fight the vested interests? 
 
0:26:46 
Arifin 
 
Yes, even though people realise you cannot do it right away, and in a 
confrontational way. Probably takes time to do that. But the most important 
thing is direction is right. 
 
0:27:00 
Nancy 
 
Just a follow up, because now you have got a very strong leader in the Governor 
of Jakarta, in Ahok, and some people think he's unpopular because he's so 
"galak," he's so in-your-face. He's not gentle in dealing with people. Is he a good 
leader for Jakarta? 
 
0:27:22 
Arifin 
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In his case, he's very good. A man of actions, but he's rather rude in dealing with 
people. He could have done it in a different way. Being decisive is fine, but how to 
be decisive is something different. How to do that, how to persuade people to 
follow your policy? In his case, I think he goes a bit too far, too... sometimes 
hurting other people's feelings. 
 
0:27:58 
Nancy 
 
Well, we wish Indonesia well, Pak Arifin. Thank you very much for your time. 
 
0:28:02 
Arifin 
 
Thank you, thank you very much Nancy. 
